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BOOK REVIEWS
One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of 
Economic Democracy. By Thomas Frank. New York: Doubleday, 2000. 414 
pages. $26.00.
The notion of an American consensus has taken a beating in the last four 
decades. Political, cultural, and social rifts appeared during the Civil Rights and 
anti- war movements of the sixties, separating the activist left from the “silent 
majority,” the hips from the squares, and the urban centers from the suburban and 
rural areas. In the eighties and nineties, the culture wars, the exploding gap 
between rich and poor, and the collapse of union power and politics seemed, like 
ice in a cracked sidewalk, to expand the fissures dividing Americans. The 
contentious 2000 presidential election demonstrated the difficulties contemporary 
politicians experience walking from one side of the tracks to the other. But in 
One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Populism, and the End o f 
Economic Democracy, Thomas Frank takes a new look at the consensus concept. 
Dismissing the conventional wisdom, Frank surveys contemporary business 
culture and “management theory” and insists that consensus has not rested in 
peace. He argues that, revived by the ideology of “market populism,” an undead 
version of American abundance theory has lumbered its way into political offices, 
boardrooms, newsrooms, and even our own family rooms.
Like his earlier The Conquest of Cool (1997), One Market Under God 
admonishes cultural critics for their almost uniform failure to address business 
culture in their studies. In assessing twenty years of business journalism, 
management theory, and business self-help books, he argues that the dominant 
strain in this literature has been the ideology of “market populism”: the belief that 
the free market, better even than the institutions of democratic government, 
expresses the beliefs and desires of Americans. This idea and its corollaries—that 
market regulation and even market criticism are elitist and undemocratic, that
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employees and consumers are “free agents” who can bargain effectively and 
directly with corporations, that political liberation parallels laissez faire economic 
freedom—would not have been notable had they been confined, as they have 
been for much of the twentieth century, to the business and advertising fields.
But in the nineties, Frank maintains, this idea became a naturalized assumption 
for large sections of society. The business public relations machine, fueled by the 
wild ebullience of the “New Economy,” the liberatory ideals of youth counter­
culture, and even multicultural relativism and resistance theory in academic 
cultural studies, helped to naturalize the manipulations and mechanics of corpo­
rate capitalism. The new narrative revealed that aging, creaky bureaucracies 
were being undermined and outwitted by agile and creative entrepreneurs. 
Absolute freedom of thought and action in the marketplace created not only a set 
of new, young billionaires, but exciting consumer choices and commercial 
abundance. Even as large portions of the population were failing to gain any 
wage increases during the boom, enough people—from former Deadhead 
computer wizards to staid corporate managers—believed in market populism to 
justify calling it a new American consensus.
Frank’s argument is compelling. As in The Conquest of Cool, he ably 
demonstrates the convergence of the counter-culture enthusiasm for liberation 
with business attempts to gain popular legitimacy, without resorting to a tired 
theory of outright co-optation. One senses that Frank’s advertisers and business 
writers are not simply decorating their arch-conservative ideals with nose rigs and 
VW Bugs; instead, they want to see themselves as “extreme” individuals identi­
fied closely with their companies’ marketing goals and products. As Frank notes 
of one management theory bible, “as a description of the tormented inner life of 
the white-collar class, it has a certain merit”(245). However, as in The Conquest 
of Cool, he has trouble sustaining his rejection of co-optation narratives. Frank 
never seems certain of the relationship between business culture and business 
practice. But in more careful moments, he recognizes the interplay between the 
two. After discussing one particularly absurd management theory (he has 
numerous examples), Frank steps back:
These things are amusing, and they are sometimes so ephemeral it is 
difficult to imagine that they have any significance at all. But they 
matter. It is worth examining the way business talks about itself, the 
fantasies it spins, the role it writes for itself in our lives.. .The culture of 
business in particular has massive consequences for the way we 
live.. .It’s a set of beliefs that, once enacted into public policy, has 
permitted an upward transfer of wealth unprecedented in our lifetimes; 
it’s a collection of symbols and narratives that understand the resulting 
wealth polarization as a form of populism, as an expression of the 
people’s will. (86)
In this explanation, businesspeople have genuine investments in business culture, 
even if that culture is bizarre and harmful. At other points, though, Frank depicts 
espousers of business culture as malevolently manipulative: “Management 
theories live and breathe.. .to reassure us—the downsized, the laid-off, the temp
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workers, the consumers—that the new way is best for all” (192). Is business 
culture, then, an organic outgrowth of business peoples’ needs and desires, or a 
mechanical creation designed to quell the masses? Frank never seems sure.
At its best, though, One Market Under God describes a nation obsessed 
by youth, liberation, consumerism, and freedom, and a business community that 
has adopted those obsessions both as an expression of its “inner-life” and as an 
instrument for social legitimacy and political power. The consensus he describes, 
then, is only in part based on “market populism.” More broadly, it is a belief in 
the good life as the freedom to “express oneself’ in both social and market 
spheres, and the corollary desire to differentiate oneself. And paradoxically, 
Americans often try to achieve this differentiation by consuming mass culture. 
Market populism ideology exemplifies what Michele Lamont describes in Money, 
Morals, and Manners as the American desire for “self-actualization.” This belief 
manifests itself not only in business managers who listen to Stone Temple Pilots 
and in the proliferation of “extreme” versions of mundane products; this ideology 
also informs our students’ cool assertion that “everyone has their own opinion” 
and our own discomfort with grading and criticizing their work. But the true 
dark side of the liberatory pursuit of “self-actualization,” as Frank demonstrates 
repeatedly, is our society’s profound failure to recognize the social and economic 
roots of this “freedom.” Forced to scramble for any healthcare at all, some 
individuals surely recognize the absurdity of the American Medical Association’s 
contention that a national health care plan would limit “choice” for patients. The 
“self-actualizing” freedom of the professional and middle classes in the United 
States is often dependent on the stagnant wages and dehumanizing jobs of the 
working class, and no amount of anti-hierarchical rhetoric and “populist” fervor 
will change that economic reality.
This, perhaps, is what galls Frank the most: that laissez faire economics 
has returned under the guise of “populism,” “democracy,” and “egalitarianism.” 
John Dos Passos, writing in response to another decade of exploding gaps 
between wealthy and working people, wrote that the American elite “have turned 
our language inside out.. .have taken the clean words our fathers spoke and made 
them slimy and foul.” But like Dos Passos, Frank insists that the language will 
survive this assault:
To the casualization of work, to the destruction of the social “safety 
net,” to the massive prison roundup, the powers of commerce added the 
staggering claim of having done it all on our behalf.. .[However] in the 
streets and the union halls and truck stops and the three-flats and the 
office blocks there remained all along a vocabulary of fact and knowing 
and memory, of wit and of everyday doubt, a vernacular that could not 
be extinguished no matter how it was cursed as “cynicism,” the resilient 
language of democracy. (358)
By closing with this last note of resistance, Frank belies his earlier assertions that 
“market populism” is truly a consensus belief. Instead, this “consensus” consists 
largely of business managers, journalists, capitalists, and advertisers—in short, 
the upper and professional classes. And by criticizing academic cultural studies,
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he aims to turn leftist scholars away from what he crudely caricatures as 
multicultural relativism, which he thinks only feeds into the “self-actualization” 
consensus. He urges scholars to turn instead to class-based analysis as a remedy 
for market populist ideology. Through his study of business culture, Frank wants 
to link cultural and economic scholarship, or, as one senses he might phrase it, 
“real” concerns and organized political action.
Michael Augspurger
137
